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NOTES AND COMMENTS

a defendant the one most responsible financially, or to bring action
against all as joint defendants, thus increasing the probability of collection of any damages, and in many cases preventing circuity of actions.28 Such a principle is recognized in negotiable instruments law
in actions by a holder against prior parties,2 9 and in real property law
in actions by a grantee against all prior grantors for breach of certain
covenants contained in the prior deeds.30
The abandonment of the privity requirement, in addition to greatly
aiding an injured plaintiff, might have the incidental but desirable effect
of forcing greater care by the manufacturer, and greater discrimination
and inspection in selection of the product by the middleman and retailer.
WALKER Y. WORTH, JR.

Wills-Per Stirpes or Per Capita Division
The difficult problem of determining the dispositive intent expressed
in an ambiguous will has reappeared in North Carolina. The testator,
in a will prepared by a layman, directed that "the remainder of my
estate is to be equally divided among my legal heirs, including said
Myrtle Coppedge Bunn, equally, share and share alike as provided by
laws of North Carolina." A brother, a half brother, eleven children of
a deceased brother and a deceased sister, and two children of a deceased
nephew were involved in the action to determine if the estate was to be
divided per capita or per stirpes. Held (one justice dissenting) that
the estate should be divided into fifteen equal shares, a per capita
distribution.'
Courts have been called on many times to interpret wills using similar language. As a result, certain phrases have been singled out as
being indicative of the testator's intention. As a general rule, a per
capita division is favored unless the will shows a contrary intent. 2 When
_' If action is brought against the manufacturer in the first instance circuity is
prevented since there will be no possibility of a purchaser-retailer action, retailerwholesaler action, and wholesaler-manufacturer action. Or if all are joined, circuity may be avoided by the retailer or wholesaler obtaining a judgment over
against the manufacturer in the same suit.
2'8 AAt. JUR., Bills and Notes §942 (1938).
30 Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N. C. 628, 634, 44 S. E. 362, 364 (1903) quoting with
approval from Spencer's Case, 1 Smith, L. C. (9th ed.) 174: ".

.

. [the] covenant

of warranty binds the original grantor and his personal representatives to the
owner of the land, and any owner during whose possession a breach occurs can
sue any or all previous covenantors ... "; 14 Am. JuR., Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions §50 (1938).
1 Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173, 66 S. E. 2d 777 (1951)
Justice Johnson,
dissenting, was of the opinion that the will should be construed to require a per
stirpes distribution. Id at 178, 66 S. E. 2d at 781.
'Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926); Ex parte Brogden,
180 N. C. 157, 104 S. E. 177 (1920); Howell v. Tyler, 91 N. C. 213 (1884) ; Britton v. Miller, 63 N. C. 268 (1869); Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. 155 (1835); 69
C. J.§1312 (1951).
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such phrases as "to be equally divided," "share and share alike," etc.,
are the only indications in the will as to how the estate is to be apportioned, they normally import a desire that each individual take an equal
share.3 However, they can just as easily be interpreted to mean an
equal division among classes 4 particularly where the beneficiaries stand
in unequal degrees of relationship.5 Use of the words "legal heirs"
points to a per stirpes distribution according to the intestate succession
laws;6 but, the coupling of expressions of equality with these words
7
changes the presumption to favor giving each individual the same share.
A general reference in the will to the intestacy statutes, for example,
"according to the laws of the state," in the situation where those claiming are of unequal degrees of kinship to the testator, indicates a desire
to have the beneficiaries take by classes. 8 Here again, expressions of
equality change this presumption to support a per capita apportionment.
Irrespective of the use of such phrases, that desire which seems to predominate throughout the entire instrument, 10 as related to the surrounding circumstances which may have influenced the testator at the time it
was written, 11 will be the decisive factor.
The problem of construing wills containing various combinations of
the foregoing phrases has been faced many times in North Carolina.
As might be expected, there has never been any one will presented to
our court which contained all of the prominent features of the instrument
in the instant case. At first glance, the decision allowing each of the
interested parties to take the same portion seems to be a reiteration of
'Re Rauschenplaut, 212 Cal. 33, 297 Pac. 882 (1931) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers,
297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921) ; Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E.
2d 131 (1942) ; Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926) ; it rc Asby,
232 Wis. 481, 287 N. W. 734 (1939).
'Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 467, 29 Am. Rep. 688 (1878); Runyan v.
Rivers, 99 Ind. App. 680, 192 N. E. 327 (1934) ; Freund v. Schilling, 222 Mo. App.
901, 6 S. W. 2d 678 (1928) ; Burgin v. Patton, 58 N. C. 425 (1860); Rogers v.
Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301 (1860).
Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. 2d 337 (1948) ; Bear v. Pitzer, 131
W. Va. 374, 47 S. E. 2d 219 (1948).
'Stephens v. Clark, 211 N. C. 84, 189 S. E. 191 (1936) ; 69 C. J. §1316.
'Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114, 278 S. W. 691 (1925); Doherty v. Grady,
105 Me. 36, 52 A 869 (1908) ; Wooten v. Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 37 S. E. 2d 682
(1946).
( Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lotbrop, 276 Mass. 469, 177 N. E. 675 (1931) ; In re
Ware, 173 Misc. 316, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1940); Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C.
393 (1826).
' Proctor v. Lacy, 263 Mass. 1, 160 N. E. 441 (1928); 57 AMt. JuR. §1229
(1948).
1
1In re Carrol, 62 Cal. App. 2d 798, 45 P. 2d 644 (1944) ; MacGregor v. Roux,
198 Ga. 520, 32 S. E. 2d 289 (1944) ; Patchell v. Groom, 158 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32
(1945) ; House v. House, 231 N. C. 218, 56 S. E. 2d 695 (1949) ; Schaeffer v.
Haseltine, 228 N. C. 484, 46 S. E. 2d 463 (1948).
" Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. 2d 15 (1936) ; In re Thompson, 202 Minn. 648, 279 N. W. 574 (1938) ; House v. House, 231 N. C. 218, 56 S. E.
2d 695 (1949); Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N. C. 484, 46 S. E. 2d 463 (1948);
Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186 S. E. 25 (1936).
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the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction. 12 Perhaps, however, a more
&letailedsurvey is necessary.
In nearly all of the cases cited as applying the general rule, an equal
division was indicated among those who were specifically named in the
will,' 3 and in two instances all the beneficiaries who were to take equally

stood in the same degree of relationship to the testator.14 These cases
required no outside reference to the statute of distributions or canons
of descent to determine who was to share the estate. It was obvious
who the testator intended should take equal shares; whereas, in the
present case, the beneficiaries were referred to only as "legal heirs."
There have been occasions when an outside reference was necessary.
The first time this situation arose, the phrase "equally divided between
my legal heirs" was construed as directing a per capita distribution
among those standing in unequal degrees of relationship to the testator.x5
It might be noted that two subsequent cases involving similar language
and circumstances held directly contra to this decision.' 6 Then, in the
1""The general rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that where an equal
division is directed among heirs, or a class of beneficiaries, even though such class
of beneficiaries may be described as heirs of deceased persons, heirs or children of
living persons, the beneficiaries take per capita and not per stirpes." Wooten v.
Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 37 S. E. 2d 682 (1946).
1 Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. 604 (1824) ("be as equally divided amongst the
heirs of my brother, John Ford, the heirs of my sister, Nanny Stowe, the heirs
of my sister, Sally Ward, deceased, and nephew, Levi Ward") ; Bryant v. Scott,
21 N. C. 155 (1835) ("to be equally divided among the persons hereafter named"

and then went on to name them); Hastings v. Earp, 62 N. C. 5 (1866)

("to be

equally divided amongst all of the legatees named in the will, except the Masons,"
where the legatees had been previously named) ; Waller v. Forsyth, 62 N. C. 353
(1866) ("to be equally divided between the children of the said Nancy Waller
and my sons, William and John") ; Britton v. Miller, 63 N. C. 268 (1869) ("to
the children of my brother, Stephen W. Britton, and of my sister, Mary Miller...
to them and their heirs forever") ; Culp v. Lee, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891)
(the "surplus shall be equally divided and paid over to Phillip J. Russell, Miss
Mary Russell and the children of my niece, Martha . . . in equal portion, share
and share alike") ; Everett v. Griffin, 174 N. C. 106, 93 S. E. 474 (1917) ("the
proceeds . . .shall be equally divided between all my children") ; Legett v. Simpson, 176 N. C. 3, 96 S. E. 638 (1918) ("to the lawful children of my nieces, Elizabeth Bateman and Charlotte Baxter") ; Ex parte Brogden, 180 N. C. 157, 104
S. E. 177 (1920) ("to be equally divided between my two sisters' children" and
then specifically named those children) ; Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E.
332 (1926) ("to said Annie L. Burton and Katie L. Cahill and their children") ;
Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E. 2d 131 (1941) ("the proceeds divided
equally between Maggie Rhew's children and Lou Bettie O'Briant and Dewey
Yarboro") ; Wooten v. Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 27 S. E. 2d 682 (1946) ("to be
equally divided among the heirs of Uncle Gus Moseley, Uncle Lam Moseley,
Aunt Florence Patrick, Aunt Laune Jackson and Aunt Darlie Kilpatrick").
" Shull v. Johnson, 55 N. C. 202 (1855) ; Hill v. Spruill, 39 N. C. 244 (1846).
1 "It is also my will . . . [that] the proceeds [be] equally divided between
my legal heirs." The statute of distributions was used as a guide for the sole
purpose of determining who were the "legal heirs." The phrase "equally divided"
was held to direct the manner of apportionment of the estate. Freeman v. Knight,
37 N. C. 72 (1841).
" In Rogers v. Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301 (1860) ("to be equally divided among
his heirs at law") ; and in Burgin v. Patton, 58 N. C. 425 (1860) ("to be equally
divided amongst my heirs except John Burgin"), a per stirpes distribution was
ordered.
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next opinion on this exact problem, these two cases were completely
ignored and once again a per capita apportionment was ordered.' 7 Only
one early case involved a direct reference to the intestate succession
laws,' 8 but the phrasing so clearly indicated that statutory apportionment was to be followed that it can hardly be considered as in point
here.
Purely as a matter of grammatical construction, the correct interpretation of the clause involved in the principal case 19 would seem to be
that urged by the dissenting opinion. 2 ° This is emphasized by the fact
that the clause, read as it is written, seems to demand that reference be
made to the intestate succession laws to determine both the question of
who takes (i.e., who are the "legal heirs") and the question of what
share is to be taken. The majority opinion rea~ds the clause to mean that
reference is to be made to the intestate succession laws to determine
only the question of who are the "legal heirs," which seems to take the
phrase, "as provided by laws of North Carolina," out of context. This
is particularly so in view of the fact that our court has previously held
that the words "legal heirs" standing alone mean the same thing as
"legal heirs as provided by the laws of North Carolina." From this
technical standpoint, the better view would probably be that the intestate
succession laws should be controlling to demand a per stirpes distribution in this situation.
Perhaps the obvious answer to all of this is that these technicalities
just do not apply. More than likely, the layman drawing this will
utilized the phrase "as provided by laws of North Carolina" only to
give the will what he might think of as "legal dignity." After all, here
was a man who probably knew nothing whatsoever about the legal distinctions set forth in our intestate succession laws. He probably never
heard the words per capita or per stirpes. If it can be said that the
technical construction given this will by both the majority and dissenting opinions is not the controlling factor, then one more important consideration favoring a stirpital distribution remains.
Under ordinary circumstances, it would not be probable that the
average person would intend that his grandnephew should have the same
"In Hackney v. Griffin, 59 N. C. 381 (1863) the court agreed with Freeman
v. Knight 37 N. C. 72 (1841) and held that "to be equally divided between all my
legal heirs" directed a per capita division of the estate. It is interesting to note
that Justice Battle, who wrote the opinions in Rogers v. Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301
(1860) and Burgin v. Patton 58 N. C. 425 (1860), and who was still a member of
the court, did not dissent in Hackney v. Griffin. For a more complete discussion,
see Long, Class Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N. C. L. REv. 297, 320 (1944).
" "... to be divided among all my legal heirs, agreeable to the statute of dis-

tributions of intestates' estates," Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C. 393, 394 (1826).
"

". .

. to be equally divided among my legal heirs . . . equally, share and

share alike as provided by laws of North Carolina." Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234
N. C. 173, 176, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
20 Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173, 178, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
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share of his estate as his brother. 21 Yet, that is the result reached by
the majority. It would seem more probable, in view of "the degree of
consanguinity to the testator," that each class of beneficiaries instead of
each individual was to have an equal share. In the case of an ambiguous
will where sufficient evidence was not available as to the testator's true
intention, would it not be better to allow this objective standard to
prevail ?
Because of the many factors which can influence the drawing of a
will of this character, and the resulting difficulty in construing it, perhaps both the majority and dissenting view can be justified. By this
decision, it would seem that where the phrase in question contains expressions of equality, a per stirpes distribution will be reached only if
there is explicit language indicating such an intent.
MORTON L. UNION.
Wills-Requirement of Signatory Intent
Testator's attested will, written entirely in the hand of one of the
witnesses thereto, was offered for probate. Her name appeared only
twice in the instrument, thus:
"Will of Hannah Williams, Sr.
Garysburg, North Carolina.
. . [Provisions of Will].

"We certify that Hannah Williams, Sr., was in her sound mind.
"... [date].

[Signatures of Witnesses]"
The scrivener-witness testified that he "put it [the name at the top]
in there to identify who she [testator] was and where she lived." The
court held the name appearing at the top to be a sufficient "signing,"
and declared the instrument a valid will.'
The original Wills Act 2 in England did not require that the will be
signed by the testator if it was properly reduced to writing.8 Later,
the Statute of Frauds 4 provided that the will be "signed by the party so
devising the same or by some other person in his presence and by his
express directions." Lemyne v. Stanley 5 interpreted this to mean that
-""Where the question is in the balance of doubt, the doubt is to be resolved
in favor of a taking per stirpes rather than per capita. One reason for this preference is that such a taking is in accord with the laws of descent and in accord
with the natural instinct of testators." Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W.
41 (1930), cited in dissenting opinion in Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173,
179, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
'In re Will of Hannah Williams, 234 N. C. 228, 66 S. E. 2d 902 (1951).
2 32 Hen. VIII c. 1 (1540).
2 Brown v. Sackville, 1 Dyer 72a (1553).
'29 Car. II c. 3 §5 (1677).
'3 Lev. 1 (1681).

